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NOTE
TYPES OF ACTIVITY ENCOMPASSED BY THE
OFFENSE OF OBSTRUCTING A
PUBLIC OFFICER
INTRODUCTION
The vast majority of jurisdictions in this country make criminal the
act of obstructing a public officer.1 The statutes establishing the offense
can be broken down into two major categories :2 the first punishing only
interference with the functions of a public official engaged in serving
process, 3 the second broadly penalizing one who "resists, delays, or obstructs
a public officer in discharging, or attempting to discharge, a duty of his
office . . . . 4 Thus, on the face of the acts, a person who interferes
with a police officer directing traffic would be subject to conviction under
the second type of statute but not under the first.5
Various operative words are used in these general obstruction statutes
of the several jurisdictions. The most common is "obstruct," but typical
phrasing in statutes of the first category also includes "oppose or resist," 6
"obstruct or resist," 7 or "resist." 8 Typical of statutes in the second
1 See MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW § 153 (1934); HARRis & WILSHIRE, CRIMINAL LAW
134 (18th ed. 1950); Comment, 6 ARK. L. RFv. 46 (1951). For the most part the
offense is statutory, but in some states it is considered a part of the common law.
See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 263 S.W.2d 238 (Ky. 1954).
2 Several states apparently have no such general provision, although they have
statutes specifically punishing acts which would elsewhere be punished under one of
the types of general obstruction statute. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 268, § 17
(1956); ORE. RaV. STAT. § 162.360 (1953), penalizing one who aids a prisoner to
escape from the custody of a policeman; compare State v. Johnson, 134 W. Va. 357,
59 S.E.2d 485 (1950) (arising under W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6015 (1955)), which held
that aiding a prisoner to escape from a policeman constitutes obstruction of the
policeman.
s A typical example of this type of statute penalizes anyone who "obstructs, re-
sists or opposes a sheriff . . . or other person duly authorized, in serving . . .
process or order of court." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:99-1 (1953). Statutes which limit
the offense to situations where the officer is serving process or arresting are in force
in at least seventeen jurisdictions.
4 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1851. Statutes which prohibit obstruction where the officer
is engaged in any duty of his office are in force in at least twenty-five jurisdictions.
5 Compare State v. Wyckoff, 8 N.J. Misc. 149, 149 Atl. 124 (Sup. Ct. 1930),
with Rex v. Goodman, [1951] 2 West. Week. R. (n.s.) 127 (B.C. Ct. App.). The
limited scope of the process-server type of statute may not help defendant, however,
since a court may hold that though the statute is inapplicable, defendant's actions
are an offense at common law. State v. Simons, 108 Me. 239, 79 Atl. 1069 (1911).
6 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 402 (1940) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 742.1 (1950) ; Miss.
CODE ANN. § 2293 (1942) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3104 (1956).
7 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2801 (1947).
S N.D. REv. CODE § 12-0821 (1943).
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category are the words "resists, delays or obstructs," 9 "impede," 10
"abuse," 11 "oppose" 12 or "deter." 13 But whatever the differences in
phrasing, courts under a given statute tend to ignore the potentially dif-
ferent areas of conduct covered by particular words and to treat all of the
operative words as subsumed within "obstruct," deemed the broadest and
most inclusive. 14 The major problem presented by the statutes is that
there is usually no attempt made to define or circumscribe the precise
types of activities intended to be included in these vague and abstract
terms., 5 And in the larger number of cases arising under them, the courts
provide no analysis of the results they reach, but merely conclude that the
particular activity in question is or is not obstruction. The purpose of this
Note is to consider the varieties of specific acts which the courts have
assimilated within the offense. In general, comparisons will be made in
terms of the basic word "obstruct," and those cases arising under statutes
not including the term "obstruct," or having other peculiarities which may
be dispositive, will be indicated. The Note will first consider the treatments
of the various courts, breaking down the activities into what appear to be
convenient patterns for consideration. The Model Penal Code,'0 which
was envisioned as "a treatise on the major problems of the penal law and
their appropriate solutions," 17 will then be examined, and predictable
results under the Code will be compared with those of the cases. Because
the crimes of disorderly conduct and disturbing the peace have close con-
nection to the general offense of obstruction in certain of its circumstances,
consideration will be given these offenses when appropriate.
One basic proposition may be established before dealing with particular
groups of cases. There is never need to show an actual physical assault
9 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-541 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 148; IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-705 (1948) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 613.56 (1947) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 94-35-169 (1947); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1851; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-223 (1953);
P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 33, § 495 (1956) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-28-54 (1953) ; VIRGIN
ISLANDS CODE tit. 14, § 1508 (1957).
10 IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-1005 (1956) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 18-272 (1950).
11NB. REv. STAT. § 28-729 (1956); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2917.33 (Page
Supp. 1959).
12 CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-18 (1953); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.747 (1954).
1 3 NEV. REv. STAT. § 197.090 (1955) ; WASH. REv. CODE § 9.18.090 (1956).
14 Research has disclosed no case where it was held that defendant's conduct did
not constitute "obstruction" but fell within the meaning of "resistance," "opposition"
or some other operative word. Perhaps the fact that these statutes are viewed as
a codification of the common law, see MILLER, CRImINAL LAW § 153 (1934), explains
their prevalent free-hand judicial treatment. See District of Columbia v. Little, 339
U.S. 1 (1950), where, although the ordinance in issue punished "interfering," the
Court relied on cases decided under statutes providing punishment for "obstructing."
15 Only a few of the statutes attempt to specify acts that will constitute obstruc-
tion. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 197.090 (1955) (threat, force or violence is ob-
struction); WIS. STAT. ANN. §'946.41 (1958) (giving false information is ob-
struction).
1 0 MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent Draft Nos. 6, 1957, and 8, 1958).
'17Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1130
(1952).
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upon the officer to make out the offense s--the statutory prohibitions en-
compass slighter acts than direct assault.19 Not only does the plain
meaning of the statutes indicate this result, but a number of states make
specific provision for actual assaults upon an officer in addition to their
general obstruction provisions, sometimes even in the same statutory sec-
tion.20  It must also be noted that there are fine distinctions drawn under
the acts with regard to such questions as whether an officer is in the per-
formance of his duties,21 whether an arrest or service of process being
resisted is lawful,2 2 and whether the officer involved is of the type that the
statute protects from obstruction. 23  The often complex problems created
by these distinctions remain outside the scope of this Note.
THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF OBSTRUCTION
Verbal Conduct
(a) Intervention for Another in Difficulty With an Officer
There is some division of the cases in situations in which the defend-
ant intervenes and speaks or acts in behalf of another involved in a dispute
with an officer. As a general proposition the offense is made out where
the defendant threatens the officer and apparently intends to carry out his
threats by acts which could be harmful to the officer.24 In the absence of
such threats the courts are substantially agreed that no obstruction lies
where the defendant complains of the propriety of the officer's actions, 25
asks informational questions of the officer,26 or requests the officer to release
' 8 Obviously an actual assault and battery is an obstruction; such cases of
physical violence will not be considered in this Note. See HARus & WImsm m,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 134.
19 See text and notes at notes 3 and 4 supra.
20 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 557.200, .220 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 4314 (1945).
21 There can be no conviction if the officer is not engaged in the performance
of his duties. Bryant v. State, 16 Neb. 651, 21 N.W. 406 (1884).
22 No conviction can arise out of resistance to an unlawful arrest. Jackson v.
Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 2d 183, 219 P.2d 879 (3d Dist 1950).
23 If the officer is of the type not afforded protection by the statute, there can be
no conviction under it. See Herdison v. State, 166 Ark. 33, 265 S.W. 84 (1924).
24 See, e.g., Reed v. State, 103 Ark. 391, 147 S.W. 76 (1912) ; McBride v. State,
68 Ga. App. 755, 24 S.E.2d 135 (1943)"; United States v. Lowry, 26 Fed. Cas. 1008
(No. 15636) (Washington, Circuit Justice, 1808) (dictum).
25 Raines v. State, 13 Ga. App. 693, 79 S.E. 860 (1913) (defendant refused to
allow police to search brother's house without warrant); State v. Anderson, 84
Ohio App. 218, 85 N.E.2d 412 (1948) (defendant complained to desk sergeant con-
cerning conduct of arresting officer) ; Levy v. Edwards, 1 Car. & P. 40, 171 Eng. Rep.
1094 (Nisi Prius 1823) (defendant told officer he had no right to handcuff boy
who was arrested for fighting) ; cf. District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
In State v. Anderson, supra, the statute involved included both "obstruct" and "inter-
fere." Oiaio GEN. CoDE ANN. § 6307-109 (Page 1945). The court spoke in terms
of the latter word.
26 People v. Magne, 187 N.Y. Supp. 913 (Ct Gen. Sess. 1921) (provided that
question is propounded in a gentlemanly manner); Commonwealth ex rel. Walker v.
Sheriff, 3 Brewst. 343 (Pa. Quarter Sess. 1869) (defendant asked for badge number
so that he might report officer's cruelty); cf. Regina v. Green, 8 Cox Crim. Cas. 441
(Assizes 1861) (no obstruction in giving evasive answer to question).
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an alleged offender.27 In The King v. Cook,28 defendant loudly criticized
police action to other bystanders as unjustified. The court, although noting
that defendant was known to have unfriendly feelings toward the police,
affirmed that "policemen are not exempt from criticism any more than
Cabinet Ministers," 29 and declined to hold defendant for obstruction.
There are, however, some decisions which do not fit the pattern
indicated. In Rex v. Goodman,30 a taxi was illegally stopped to allow
defendant passenger to alight. When a policeman accosted the driver,
defendant intervened to assert that he was to blame for the illegal stop,
since the driver had merely followed his orders. The ensuing discussion
grew loud and vigorous and attracted a crowd; in the confusion, as the
officer moved onto the sidewalk with defendant to continue the argument,
the taxi driver drove away. With only a mention of the taxi's departure
during the dispute and no apparent reliance upon that fact, the court
affirmed a conviction for obstruction primarily on the grounds that defend-
ant's conduct-including loud shouting and refusal to move on when told
to do so-interfered with the officer in the performance of his duties. In
Anderson v. United States,31 defendant challenged a policeman's legal
right to give a third party a parking ticket. Defendant subsequently re-
sisted the policeman's attempt to arrest him for "either 'disorderly' or
'interference,' "32 and the issue presented to the court was the lawfulness
of defendant's arrest. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the
arrest of defendant was legal and so charged the jury despite a dispute in
the evidence over the manner of defendant's interjection-whether or not
it had been orderly. And the appellate court affirmed the conviction for
assault, necessarily deciding that defendant was guilty of interference in
whichever manner he had conducted himself.33 In State v. Coy,3 4 a police-
man was about to issue traffic citations for cars illegally parked across the
street from defendant's theater and belonging to his patrons. Defendant
protested, claiming political influence and friendship with the officer's
27 State v. Knudsen, 27 S.D. 400, 131 N.W. 400 (1911) (defendant grasped
sheriff's shoulder with his one good hand while making the request) ; Mouse v. State,
127 Tex. Crim. 635, 78 S.W.2d 631 (1935) (semble); cf. Platt v. Greenwood, 50
Ariz. 158, 69 P2d 1032 (1937).
28 11 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 32 (B.C. County Ct. 1906) ; accord, City of Chicago v.
Brod, 141 Ill. App. 500 (1908) (defendant said of policeman's actions toward another
"well, he doesn't need to shoot him"); cf. State v. Morrison, 46 Kan. 679, 27 Pac.
133 (1891) (dictum).
29 11 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 32, 33 (B.C. County Ct. 1906).
30 [1951] 2 West Weekly R. (n.s.) 127 (B.C. Ct. App.) (bulk of opinion devoted
to problem of whether defendant's conduct was "wilful" within the prohibition of
the statute) ; cf. Bain v. The Queen, 111 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 281, 286 (Man. Ct.
App. 1955) (concurring opinion) ; White v. Edmunds, Peake 123, 124, 170 Eng. Rep.
101, 102 (Nisi Prius 1791), in which Lord Kenyon remarked "when a man is in the
custody of the officers of justice no other person has a right to interfere."
s1253 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
82 Ibid.
33 See statement of Edgerton, C.J., and Bazelon, J., on denial of rehearing,
Anderson v. United States, 253 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1957). For the nature of the
argument see Anderson v. United States, 132 A2d 155 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1957).
84 40 Wash. 2d 112, 241 P.2d 205 (1952).
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superiors. When the owner of one of the vehicles returned and the police-
man proceeded with the issuance of the citation, defendant advised his
patron to give him the ticket, saying he would take care of it. Defendant
cursed the policeman; the policeman told him to leave; defendant replied
that the policeman should keep his mouth shut. The officer repeated the
order to leave and added a threat of arrest if defendant refused to comply.
Defendant stood his ground and when the policeman informed him that he
was under arrest, swung out striking the officer's arm and knocking the
book of traffic tickets to the ground. He then ran for his theater, but the
officer overtook him in the lobby, and a struggle ensued. When a crowd
gathered, the officer left to get a warrant. One was issued under an inter-
ference statute providing that "every person who, by means of any threat,
force or violence, shall attempt to deter or prevent any . . . officer from
performing any duty imposed upon him by law" 35 is guilty of the offense.
The reviewing court held that from the evidence a jury could find defend-
ant guilty. Sufficient force to meet the statutory terms could be found in
the act of knocking the book of tickets to the ground and the struggle in the
lobby, and the jury could infer a course of conduct on the part of defendant
designed to prevent the officer from carrying out his legal duty of issuing a
traffic citation.
(b) Protestation in One's Own Defense
Courts which hold that one who argues or questions in another's behalf
has obstructed might be expected to find the offense committed also when
an individual argues or questions in his own behalf. The obstruction
statutes aim to deter impediment of the efficient functioning of officials;
delay and hindrance of an officer do not vary whether the objector is direct
participant or intervenor. Distinction could be drawn, however, in view of
the differential degrees of affirmative, self-assertive conduct involved in the
two roles; there may be enough social value in protest-as a last curb upon
official omnipotence-to permit it to one who is the target of official activity,
while denying it to all others.30 In any event, cases of self-protecting
protestation do not appear to have arisen in those jurisdictions which have
found obstruction on the part of verbal intervenors. And in other juris-
dictions most courts which have been presented with the issue have refused
35 WAsH. REv. CoDE § 9.18.090 (1956).
36 Although police freedom from the verbal attacks of third parties be deemed
necessary to police effectiveness, the same freedom as regards one against whom the
officer is initiating action may be viewed as too high a price-too fraught with danger
of abuse--to pay for effectiveness. It is one thing to say that an individual may not
accost and question a government agent, another that he must obey the agent with-
out question. And while the protestant who argues in his own behalf remains
amenable nevertheless to whatever police activity he is protesting-insofar as that
activity is lawful-the intervenor, if he is not to be punished under the general ob-
struction statutes, is not punishable at all. The very vagueness of the statutory lan-
guage may give courts an opportunity to weigh this kind of consideration in application
of the acts.
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on a variety of grounds to find obstruction.3" Some courts have reasoned
that argument is only indicative of an intent to obstruct,38 or that obstruc-
tion is not made out unless there is shown to have been a fair chance of the
occurrence of violence.39 Others have summarily rejected the idea that mere
discussion conducted in a peaceful fashion can be obstruction.40  Still other
courts have taken the position that profanity and dispute may be obstruction
and that it is a jury question whether the words in issue did obstruct the
officer; 4 1 if the jury believe that argument or profanity was so vociferous
that the officer was dissuaded from further action because of threat of
bodily harm, and if the verdict is not clearly erroneous, it will be allowed to
stand.42  Similarly, whether argument in one's own behalf is punishable
either as disorderly conduct or as disturbing the peace depends on the
n anner of argument, the act of arguing being insufficient ipso facto to
constitute the offenses. Mere impudence,43 or calm argumentation 44 is not
disorderly conduct. Even when mild profanity or insulting language is
used, the offense is not made out unless a crowd is attracted.45 However,
if the language is more of the "fighting word" variety, such as "scum of the
earth" 46 or "bastard," 47 the crime of disorderly conduct is committed. The
same indefinite line between conduct which is criminal and that which is
not seems to obtain where the offense charged is disturbing the peace.
48
37 See, e.g., Wimberly v. State, 30 Ala. App. 394, 6 So. 2d 524 (1942) (operative
words of statute are "oppose and resist"); Sloan v. City of Moultrie, 61 Ga. App.
885, 7 S.E.2d 760 (1940) ; State v. Scott, 123 La. 1085, 49 So. 715 (1909) ; People v.
Maddaus, 5 App. Div. 2d 886, 172 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1958); Statham v. State, 41 Ga.
507 (1870) (dictum). Cf. McGeorge v. Commonwealth, 237 Ky. 358, 35 S.W.2d
530 (1931) (where indictment charges use of force and only abusive language is shown
there is fatal variance) ; People v. Tinston, 6 Misc. 2d 485, 163 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Magis.
Ct. 1957) (refusal to identify self and quarreling with police over identification not
disorderly conduct). Contra, The King v. Matheson, 41 N.B. 581, 12 D.L.R. 480
(1913); cf. People v. Cancel, 54 P.R.R. 26 (1938).
38 See, e.g., State v. Scott, .ipra note 37.
39 See, e.g., Statham v. State, 41 Ga. 507 (1870) (dictum).
4 0 See, e.g., People v. Maddaus, 5 App. Div. 2d 886, 172 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1958).
41 State v. Scott, 123 La. 1085, 49 So. 715 (1909) ; State v. Estes, 185 N.C. 752,
117 S.E. 581 (1923) ; accord, Ex parte Geissler, 4 Fed. 188 (N.D. Ill. 1880) (dictum);
Campf v. State, 80 Ohio St. 321, 88 N.E. 887 (1909) (dictum). Where the officer
has completed performance of his duty, the question as to whether a given act might
constitute obstruction does not arise, since the officer's performance of duty cannot
be obstructed. Knoff v. State, 18 Okla. Crim. 36, 192 Pac. 596 (1920).
42 See cases cited note 41 supra.
43 Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 44 N.W. 579 (1889).
44 State v. Korich, 219 Minn. 268, 17 N.W.2d 497 (1945).
45 Ruthenbeck v. First Criminal Court, 7 N.J. Misc. 969, 147 AtI. 625 (Sup. Ct.
1925) (defendant called officer "muttonhead"; conviction reversed); People v.
Cuvelier, 8 Misc. 2d 823, 167 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Wayne County Ct. 1957) (defendant
called officer "son of a bitch"; conviction reversed for lack of proof that this attracted
anyone's attention); Commonwealth v. Gabrow, 97 Pa. Super. 459 (1929) (loud
argument attracted crowd; conviction affirmed); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 95 Pa.
Super. 382 (1928) (dictum).
46 State v. O'Donnell, 200 Atl. 739 (N.J. Sup. Ct 1934).
47 City of Cleveland Heights v. Christie, 128 Ohio St 297, 190 N.E. 770, cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 574 (1934).
48 See People ex rel. Conley v. Frank, 245 App. Div. 777, 281 N.Y. Supp. 158
(1935) (indictment charging offensive, abusive shouting held sufficient); Common-
1960]
394 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
(c) Misinformation
The courts in the few cases which have presented the problem have
held that lying to police who are seeking information does not constitute
obstruction.49  However, the rationales for the decisions vary. In several
cases the result was reached by reliance upon particular statutory phrasing,
the courts reasoning that because such words as "forcibly" 50 or "resist-
ing" 1 were used in conjunction with "obstruction," some physical action
must be present to make out the offense.
52  In Miller v. United States,53
the court reached the same result in dealing with a statute which did
not contain the word "forcibly." 54 Here the federal officers to whom
defendant falsely denied that a fugitive was hidden on her premises were
aware that defendant was lying although, because they had no search
warrant to enter her home, they could not confirm their suspicions. The
court concluded that since the officers were not in fact deceived, since
defendant had in any event a right to insist upon a warrant, and since the
sole effect of her denials was to force the officers to procure that warrant,
no conviction for obstruction could be sustained. In People v. Cintron,55
defendant, asked whether a certain person was present in his place of
business, untruthfully replied that she was not. Later, police returned
and were able to identify the person they sought. The reviewing court
reversed defendant's conviction for lack of proof of wilfulness, intimating
however that if such proof were made, conviction would have been affirmed.
In a somewhat related situation it has been held that declining to give
one's name to police is not in itself disorderly conduct.56 Under the general
obstruction statutes, too, distinction might be made between a refusal to
wealth v. Savko, 76 Pa. D. & C. 310 (Quarter Sess. 1951). But cf. Oratowski v.
Civil Service Comm'n, 3 Ill. App. 2d 551, 123 N.E.2d 146 (1954) (fact that X
called policeman "stupid" is not an offense justifying arrest so as to vitiate charge of
conduct unbecoming an officer); Scott v. Feilschmidt, 191 Iowa 347, 182 N.W. 382
(1921) (defendant's motion for directed verdict in suit for false imprisonment denied
despite proof that defendant arrested plaintiff for disturbing the peace after plaintiff
called him a "bastard").
49 See cases cited notes 52-54 infra.
50 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1958) ("forcibly . . . resists, opposes, impedes, ... or
interferes").
51 Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act, 48 & 49 Vict, c. 75, § 2 (1885), pro-
vides that "resisting or wilfully obstructing" a constable is a criminal offense.
52 Long v. United States, 199 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1945); Curlett v. M'Keclnie,
[1939] 1 ScoTs L.T. 11 (Justiciary 1938) ; cf. Regina v. Green, 8 Cox Crim. Cas. 441
(Assize 1861) (giving evasive answer to question not obstruction). But cf. In re
Billington, 156 App. Div. 63, 141 N.Y. Supp. 16 (1913) (dictum in disbarment pro-
ceeding that giving false information to police is obstruction) ; Rex v. L., 51 Ont. L.R.
575, 583, 69 D.L.R. 618, 625 (1922) (dictum).
53 230 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1956).
54 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (1958).
55 66 P.R.R. 232 (1946).
56 Leighton v. Getchell, 169 N.W. 649 (Iowa 1918) ; People v. Tinston, 6 Misc. 2d
485, 163 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Magis. Ct. 1957) ; Commonwealth v. Chalmers, 76 Pa. D. & C.
218 (Quarter Sess. 1950); Myers v. Collett, 1 Utah 2d 406, 268 P.2d 432 (1954)
(dictum).
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aid police and an affirmative deception that sends them astray.5 7 It
should be noted that several states have specifically provided by statute that
knowingly giving false information to the police with intent to mislead is
obstructing an officer.
58
(d) Counseling a Third Person to Resist
In addition to his possible criminal liability as an accomplice 59 or for
the offense of soliciting to crime, 60 one who counsels or advises another to
resist or to obstruct the police may in some circumstances be punishable
under the general obstruction statutes.6 1  Cases are rare. In State v.
Caldwell,62 defendant advised one Moore to draw a line on the ground,
asserting that if the sheriff tried to cross the line to serve process, Moore
would be within his legal rights if he defended himself, even to the extent of
killing the sheriff. Moore drew the line and when the sheriff crossed it,
struck him with a stake. The court upheld defendant's conviction under
a general obstruction statute, saying by way of reply to an argument that
merely advising another did not make out the offense, that defendant's
actions amounted to more than advice. The court pointed to defendant's
5 7 Compare the reasoning in United States v. Philippe, 173 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) (false claims statute).
5 8 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-729 (1943); WAsH. REv. CoDE § 9.69.060 (1951); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 946.41 (1958).
59 Common-law liability as a principal in the second degree must be predicated
upon finding (1) a guilty principal in the first degree, (2) that the person sought
to be convicted as a principal in the second degree was actually or constructively
present when the offense was committed, and (3) that he aided or abetted the com-
mission of the offense. CLARK & MARSHALL, CPinEs § 8.0Z at 449 (6th ed. 1958).
It has been said that every person present at the commission of a crime who encourages
it or incites it in any way is assumed by the law to be an aider or abettor. 1 BURDIcK,
CRI E § 221 (1946). Common-law liability as an accessory before the fact (liability
as an accessory, technically, is limited at common law to participation in felonies;
all participants in misdemeanors are punishable, if at all, as principals) need not be
predicated upon presence at the commission of the offense: the accessory is liable as
such if he procures, counsels or commands another to commit it. Id. § 223, at 298,
§ 219, at 293. Some statutes abolish the distinctions among principals of the first and
second degrees and accessories before the fact. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§2, 3 (1958).
Others retain it in form but provide for equality of punishment. For thorough dis-
cussion see id. at § 227.
60 "Solicitation is a distinct common-law misdemeanor in which the act forbidden
consists of the accused person's parol or written efforts to activate another to com-
mit a criminal offense." CiAR & MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 59, § 4.02, at 194.
"The act solicited need not be committed to allow a punishment for solicitation."
Id. at 197. Thus, if the resistance or obstruction counseled were a crime, counseling
might amount to solicitation. However, while it is undoubted that solicitation to
commit a felony is a crime, amenability to punishment at common law of solicitation
to commit a misdemeanor is disputed. "Some cases have held that no misdemeanors
should be included . . . but the general rule is that it is a crime to solicit one to
commit a misdemeanor provided it is of such a character that it affects the public
peace and justice." 1 BURDICK, op. cit. supra note 59, § 104, at 116. See generally,
Curran, Solicitation: A Substantive Crime, 17 MINN. L. REv. 499 (1933); Note,
Solicitations, 41 DIcK. L. REv. 225 (1937). Note that inasmuch as solicitation
is a common-law crime, in jurisdictions where all crimes are statutory, only those
solicitations expressly enumerated by statute are culpable. 1 BURDIcK, op. cit. supra
note 59, at § 107.
6 1 Wis. Stat § 346.39 (1953), since repealed, specifically prohibited this activity.
622 Tyler 212 (Vt. 1802).
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"direction" that Moore draw a line and to defendant's own cautioning of
the sheriff not to pass, and concluded that "if the Jury considered that the
defendant's conduct impeded or hindered the officer in the execution of his
office, they must find him guilty." 63 Thus, at least where the advisor is
present on the immediate scene of the altercation, where he advises physical
aggression, and where that aggression is actualized, he is guilty of obstruc-
tion. To what extent the act of advising will be punishable in the absence
of one or another of these three elements remains questionable. Language
in a case sustaining the conviction of a labor organizer for encouraging
pickets to charge a police cordon asserts that one who advises another to
resist an officer is criminally responsible even though that other refuses to
follow the advice. 4 But this decision was under a statute particularly
punishing counsel or advice to obstruct as well as obstruction.6 5 Another
case finds violation where defendant urged third persons only to refuse to
give their names to policemen during the course of a raid; but here the
advice was couched in terms abusive of the officers.6 6 No case has been
discovered penalizing the giving of advice where the advisor was not
immediately involved in the conflict situation.
(e) Warning Others of the Presence of Police
A line of English decisions illustrates the complexities of applying the
illusive obstruction doctrine to fact situations in which defendant, by
alerting third persons that law enforcement officials are nearby, causes
those persons to alter their behavior in a way which makes more difficult
the officials' performance of their duty. In Bastable v. Little,6 7 defendant
posted himself near a device maintained by the police for measuring the
speed of passing vehicles and signalled approaching motorists that police
were ahead. Quite naturally, the motorists slowed down. A conviction
for obstructing was reversed in the absence of proof that the motorists
had been previously speeding, Alverstone, C.J., maintaining that lacking
such proof no duty of the constables had been affected, and Darling, J.,
agreeing and drawing a distinction between warning to prevent the commis-
sion of a crime and warning to avoid apprehension after the crime has been
committed. In Betts v. Stevens,68 substantially the same court upheld the
conviction where it was shown that the cars were in fact speeding prior to
63 Id. at 215.
64 Teske v. State, 256 Wis. 440, 446, 41 N.W.2d 642, 645 (1950). Defendant
advisor was convicted of counseling resistance, while his codefendant advisees were
acquitted of resisting. The codefendants were convicted of disorderly conduct, how-
ever, and the court viewed their acquittal on the resistance charge as a jury com-
promise: clearly they had in fact followed defendant's advice. The rule that advising
is culpable despite its rejection by the advisee is at best an alternative holding: the
court more heavily relies on the rule that logical inconsistency in criminal verdicts
is not fatal.
65 See note 61 mura.
66 Rex v. L., 51 Ont. L.R. 575, 69 D.L.R. 618 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
67 [1907] 1 K.B. 59 (1906).
68 [1910] 1 K.B. 1 (1909).
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defendant's warning.6 9 Hinchcliffe v. Sheldon1 0 involved the son of an
innkeeper who, returning home after the legal hours for sale of intoxicants
and observing police watching at the windows, knocked on the door and
shouted a warning to those inside. The police immediately closed on the
house, but by the time they could secure entrance eight minutes later, they
found only a well populated room and a wet bar counter: no licensing
offense could be proved. The court, however, affirmed the son's conviction
for obstruction, distinguishing Bastable v. Little on the basis that the
Licensing Act gave the police special authorization to enter licensed
premises at any time, and that this authorization imposed a duty on officers
to enter whenever they were suspicious of infractions-a duty whose per-
formance the son's act delayed. Whether or not this distinction is tenable
-whether the British police indeed have a duty to investigate possible
violations of the liquor laws but a corresponding duty only to enforce actual
violations as regards the traffic laws-the approach of the English courts is
illuminating. Apparently feeling the need to qualify the over-broad concept
of obstruction (which, in its unlimited statutory expanse, not only would
threaten with criminal penalty virtually every individual contact with
government officers, but also would permit such absurd results as convic-
tion of persons who, by preventing the incidence of crime, prevent also the
incidence of crime enforcement) the courts have resorted to viewing the
policeman's activity as a complex of separate, discontinuous, specific duties.
A warning which will impede the performance of one of these particular
duties is punishable as an obstruction. 71
Physical Acts
While a number of jurisdictions make specific provision for the sepa-
rate crime of resisting arrest,7" activity punishable as resistance will usually
also fall within the terms of the general obstruction statutes,73 inasmuch as
arrest is made under warrant-an instrument of process-or otherwise
within the scope of duty of the arresting officer. Though courts do tend
to speak in distinct terms of "resisting arrest" and "obstructing justice,"
they appear to accord scant attention to the wording of the particular
enactment applicable 74 and to treat both concepts flexibly as common-law
crimes.
69 Lord Alverstone, C.J., and Darling, J., followed their prior opinions. Buck-
nill, J., concurred in both opinions.
70 [1955] 3 All E.R. 406 (Q.B.).
7lApparently no American court has considered an instance of warning under
the general obstruction statutes or upon prosecution for disorderly conduct or dis-
turbing the peace.
72 See, e.g., ALASxA ComnP. LAWs ANN. §65-7-18a (Supp. 1958); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 10-1005 (1956).
7 3 For examples of prosecutions for resisting arrest under general obstruction
statutes see, e.g., State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E2d 100 (1954); State v.
Beckendorf, 79 Utah 360, 10 P.2d 1073 (1932).
74 See cases cited note 73 supra. See also 2 ALEXADER, AmST § 596 (1949).
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(a) Minor Scuffling and Flight
Present case law restricts the non-punishable use of force in any form
-even such merely technical batteries as brushing aside an advancing
officer or breaking away from his grip-to those situations in which the
attempted arrest or service of process is illegal.75 So long as the officer is
acting with lawful authority, a slight pushing can constitute obstruction.
76
Similarly, knocking the papers from the hands of a serving officer has been
found to be resistance within the meaning of the pertinent statute.77 By
contrast, if even in some such merely technical respect as defective process
the actions of the officer are outside the scope of his duties, threats or
actual assault and battery are not punishable.7 8 Some statutes specifically
punish all violent physical conflicts as disorderly conduct,79 while most of
the other disorderly conduct legislation is broad enough to cover such
activity: s the disorderly charge has in fact been used to punish minor
affrays.8 It is apparent that nearly any scuffle, if in a public place, can be
found a disturbance of the peace.
82
The flight cases are those in which defendant has foiled arrest, service
of process, or some other official action by making off when the officer
attempted to perform his duty; the courts have divided on the question of
whether such conduct is obstruction. In Carter v. United States,83 where
an officer was following up a lead concerned with the conduct of lotteries,
defendant started his car away with the officer half in and half out of it.
The car eventually attained a speed of sixty miles per hour with the officer
clinging to the back of the front seat and the vent shield. The court af-
firmed a conviction for forcible obstruction. Similarly, flights in which
defendants endangered pursuing officers by smoke screen 8 4 or by swerving
the fleeing automobile from side to side 8 5 have been held to constitute
75 See, e.g., People v. Craig, 152 Cal. 42, 91 Pac. 997 (1907).
76 State v. Best, 91 W. Va. 559, 113 S.E. 919 (1922); cf. Granado v. State,
161 Tex. Crim. 128, 275 S.W.2d 680 (1955).
7 7 King v. State, 89 Ala. 43, 8 So. 120 (1890); cf. State v. Merrill, 52 S.D.
129, 216 N.W. 874 (1927).
7 8 People v. Manriquez, 138 Cal. App. 614, 33 P2d 36 (4th Dist. 1934) ; Pettis v.
State, 209 Miss. 726, 48 So. 2d 355 (1950) ; Bryant v. State, 16 Neb. 651, 21 N.W. 406
(1884) ; cf. Moses v. State, 6 Ga. App. 251, 64 S.E. 699 (1909). The rule is stated
that once "it is held that the officer is not engaged in the lawful discharge of his
duties . . . the defendant is consequently justified in interfering." MILLER, CRIMNAL
LAw § 153, at 462 (1934).
79 See, e.g., DEa.. CoDE ANN. tit. 11, § 471 (1953) ; MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 615.17
(1958).
80 See, e.g., IDAHo CODE ANN. § 18-6409 (1947); IowA CoDE ANN. § 744.1
(1950).
81 See, e.g., McKee v. State, 75 Okla. Crim. 390, 132 P.2d 173 (1942).
82See MI.EaR, CRimiNAL LAw § 165 (1934).
83 231 F.2d 232 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 984 (1956). Cf. The King v.
Griffin, 9 Mar. Prov. 84, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 503 (N.B.) (defendant brushed officer off
running board by driving close to corner of house).
84 Lewin v. United States, 62 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1933). The court said in
dictum that if the smoke screen had served merely to obscure the flight no offense
would have been proven.
85 Hogg v. United States, 35 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1929).
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obstruction. According to a few courts merely driving off or refusing to
stop is also an offense.86 On the other hand, in Jones v. Commonwealth,87
defendant was riding in a car containing barley, hops, yeast and sugar when
special liquor control agents gave chase. Defendant's driver set off at high
speed and in mid-flight defendant threw a bag of barley out the window
into the highway so that the following officers were forced to swerve to
avoid hitting it. The appellate court reversed a conviction for obstruction on
grounds that avoidance is not obstruction, that the barley bag created no
grave danger to the officers, and that the evidence raised at least a reason-
able doubt that the bag was thrown to avoid being caught with it rather
than to prevent the officers from following. Apparently no court has yet
considered whether instances of flight are punishable as disorderly conduct
or breach of the peace. Both concepts, however, have been defined widely
enough to include at least such flights as by their manner are capable of
causing public alarm or disquietude. 88
(b) Blocking Access by an Officer
Cases in which public officers, seeking entrance to or exit from prem-
ises in attempts to arrest or to search or inspect, have been impeded by
physical obstacles interposed by defendant are variously treated by the
courts. In District of Columbia v. Little,89 a health inpector sought to
enter defendant's premises without a warrant. Defendant refused to un-
lock the door, claiming that his entry would violate her constitutional
rights. She neither used nor threatened force of any kind.90 The Supreme
86 Under REv. STAT. §3068 (1875), as amended, 49 Stat. 528 (1935), 19 U.S.C.
§70 (1958), providing for penalty if a master "shall obstruct or hinder" revenue
officers attempting to board a boat, refusal to stop has been held an obstruction. The
Gander, 54 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1931) ; The Barracouta, 42 Fed. 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1890) ;
cf. The Dolphin, 291 Fed. 380 (S.D. Fla. 1923); People v. Hill, 131 Misc. 521, 227
N.Y. Supp. 285 (Lewis County Ct. 1928). But cf. State v. Le Blanc, 115 Me. 142, 98
AtI. 119 (1916) (dictum). Similarly, it has been held that driving off with an auto-
mobile about to be searched by authority of a valid search warrant is "obstruction."
Brown v. Commonwealth, 263 S.W.2d 238 (Ky. 1954). Several Canadian cases hold
that refusal to stop is obstruction under CAN. CR_. CODE § 167 (1927), which provides
that whoever "resists or wilfully obstructs any public officer" shall be punished. The
King v. D'Entremont, 4 Mar. Prov. 142, [1932] 2 D.L.R. 236 (N.S. 1931); Rex v.
Gallant, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 671 (P. Edw. I.).
87 141 Va. 471, 126 S.E. 74 (1925). Cf. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 239 Ky.
58, 40 S.W.2d 265 (1931), where the court held that swerving an automobile from
side to side in order to prevent capture was not "obstruction." However, the context
of the case-a prosecution for murder in which defendant policeman, who killed a
fugitive, attempted justification on grounds that the fugitive was committing the
felony of obstructing-weakens the force of this holding.
8 8 5 ee, e.g., State v. Van Allen, 140 Conn. 586, 102 A.2d 526 (1954) (to constitute
disturbing the peace it is sufficient that act naturally causes serious disquietude on
the part of those in the vicinity); State v. Reynolds, 243 Minn. 196, 66 N.W.2d
886 (1954) (to constitute disorderly conduct it is sufficient that act affects the peace
and quiet of those who witness it, or disturbs or provokes them to resentment). It
has been said that breach of the peace and disturbing the peace are substantially
synonymous. See People v. Anderson, 117 Cal. App. 763, 1 P.2d 64 (App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1931).
89 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
90Id. at 5.
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Court avoided decision of the complex fourth and fifth amendment problems
involved 91 by interpreting the ordinance, which penalized "interfering with
or preventing any inspection," 92 as neither imposing on homeowners a duty
to assist health inspectors nor encompassing an owner's failure to unlock
her door, accompanied by remonstrations based on "substantial" constitu-
tional grounds. Reversal of conviction was affirmedY
3
Some courts have suggested that if defendant refuses to unlock an
already locked door there is no obstruction, but that if he locks or closes an
open door, he is punishable.94 However, this distinction, based upon an
interpretation of "obstruct" as requiring a positive act,9 5 is not widely
utilized: a number of courts have reached similar results without invoking
it; 96 other courts reach opposite results without refuting it.9 7 In the
distinguishable class of cases in which defendant, by straddling the doorway,
has prevented police from entering or from leaving, most courts have found
the offense of obstruction.98 These same types of activity do not per se
amount to disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace, but the manner in
which they are done may make out the crime.99
91 See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), 108 U. PA. L. REv. 265 (1959).
92 Washington, D.C., Commissioners' Regulations Concerning the Use and Occu-
pancy of Buildings and Grounds § 12, April 22, 1897, as amended, July 28, 1922.
93 People v. Maddaus, 5 App. Div. 2d 886, 172 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1958), relied on
Little to reach a similar result under a similar statute. But see United States v.
McDonald, 26 Fed. Cas. 1074 (No. 15667) (E.D. Wis. 1879) (jury charge that
refusing to open door is obstruction) ; Blossom Infants' Wear Corp. v. Soltoff, 46 Pa.
D. & C. 11 (Magis. Ct. 1942) (dictum). See People v. Conese, 40 N.Y. Grim. 457,
203 N.Y. Supp. 596 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1923), where it was held not to be disorderly
conduct to ask a policeman to leave when the policeman could present no authority
for being on defendant's premises.
94 See, e.g., Vince v. State, 113 Ga. 1070, 39 S.E. 435 (1901) ; Regina v. Semeniuk,
14 West. Weeldy R. (n.s.) 523 (Alberta Dist. Ct. 1955).
95 See cases cited note 94 sipra.
96 See, e.g., State v. Merryfield, 180 Kan. 267, 303 P.2d 155 (1956) (going into
house and locking the door held obstruction); The King v. Munn, 13 Mar. Prov.
247, 253 [1938] 4 D.L.R. 504, 510 (P. Edw. I.) (dictum) (refusal to unlock door
not obstruction); cf. People v. Dow, 117 Mich. 573, 76 N.W. 89 (1898) (telling in-
spector to use another door not obstruction).
97 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rhone, 174 Pa. Super. 166, 100 A.2d 147 (1953)
(refusal to open trunk of car held obstruction) ; Commonwealth v. Farling, 12 Pa.
Dist. 732 (Quarter Sess. 1903) (closing and hooking screen door not obstruction).
These cases are perhaps distinguishable: in the latter, where the home was involved,
the court relied upon the concept of a man's home as his personal domain.
98 See, e.g., Drifoos v. City of Jonesboro, 107 Ark. 99, 154 S.W. 196 (1913);
People ex rel. Fried v. Frank, 73 Misc. 1, 130 N.Y. Supp. 807 (Spec. Term 1911);
City of Clovis v. Archie, 60 N.M. 239, 290 P.2d 1075 (1955); Appling v. State, 95
Ark. 185, 128 S.W. 866 (1910) (dictum). But cf. Hutchinson v. State, 9 Ga. App.
62, 70 S.E. 352 (1911).
99 Compare City of Chicago v. Holmes, 339 Ill. App. 146, 88 N.E.2d 744 (1949)
(locking door to prevent entry by others held not disorderly conduct), with Whitten
v. Mayor & Aldermen, 26 Ga. App. 377, 106 S.E. 302 (1921) (slamming door in face
of police while cursing held disorderly conduct), and People v. Hipple, 263 N.Y.
242, 188 N.E. 725 (1934) (blocking public doorway by refusing to move on held
disorderly conduct). The last result may have been compelled by N.Y. PEN. LAw
§ 722(2), which punishes anyone who "acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb,
interfere with, obstruct, or be offensive to others."
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(c) Refusal to Follow an Officer's Order
Where a police officer orders a person or a group to move on or to
disperse, most courts hold that failure to comply is obstruction or resist-
ance.100 One court, sustaining conviction under an "interference" ordi-
nance where defendant had been slow in moving off, has said that "such
interference occurs if what defendant did was calculated in any appreciable
degree to hamper or impede the police in the performance of their duties as
they saw them." '0 ' Typically opinions treating fact situations of these
types offer no such statement of broad guiding principle, but rather con-
lude without analysis that the conduct is punishable. Courts which have
been faced with the problem indicate a split as to whether behavior of this
type is punishable either as disorderly conduct 10 2 or as breach of the
peace.'
03
No consistent pattern is revealed by the cases in which the official's
order is one other than to move on or to disperse. One court has held that
100 See Commonwealth v. Baltzley, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 235 (Quarter Sess. 1957)
(refusal to break up human chain); Despard v. Wilcox, 102 L.T.R. (n.s.) 103
(K.B. 1910) (refusal to leave street in front of Prime Minister's residence) ; Pank-
burst v. Jarvis, 101 L.T.R. (n.s.) 946 (K.B. 1909) (refusal to leave street in front of
Parliament); Rex v. Johanson, [1947] 2 D.L.R. 458 (B.C. Ct. App. 1946), reV'd on
other grounds, [1947] 4 D.L.R. 337 (Can. Sup. Ct) (refusal to move on); Rex v.
Golden, 51 B.C. 236, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 350 (Ct App. 1936) (refusal to stop selling
flowers and move on When told to do so by officer); The King v. Leclaire, 12 Can.
Crim. Cas. Ann. 332 (Que. K.B. 1906) (refusal to move from cab stand); People v.
Southern, 274 Mich. 628, 265 N.W. 759 (1936) (alternative holding). Compare
People v. Lo Vecchio, 185 Misc. 197, 56 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Utica City Ct 1945) (refusal
to move on not disorderly conduct) ; Imason v. Cope, 5 Car. & P. 193, 172 Eng. Rep.
936 (Nisi Prius 1831). This last case cited was an action for assault and battery
against a policeman who argued that his use of force was necessary inasmuch as plain-
tiff had refused to move back. The court directed a verdict for plaintiff, saying that
no blow should have been struck.
101 State v. Taylor, 38 N.J. Super. 6, 30, 118 A.2d 36, 48 (App. Div. 1955).
The ordinance involved provides that those who "in any manner interfere with . . .
any member of the police force . . . in the lawful discharge of his duty" shall be
punished. Rnv. ORDINANCES OF NEwARx § 20.24 (1951).
102 Some cases hold such refusal not disorderly conduct. People v. Swald, 190
Misc. 239, 73 N.Y.S.2d 399 (Utica City Ct. 1947); People v. Dale, 47 N.Y.S.2d 702
(Utica City Ct 1944); People v. De Stefanis, 34 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Utica City Ct
1942); ef. City of Chicago v. Corney, 13 Ill. App. 2d 396, 142 N.E.2d 160 (1957);
People v. Gilinsky, 203 Misc. 46,' 113 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Broome County Ct 1952);
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 214, 46 S.E.2d 384 (1948). Others, which may be
explained on a theory of incipient riot, hold that refusal to disperse is disorderly
conduct Bennett v. City of Dalton, 69 Ga. App. 438, 25 S.E.2d 726, cert. denied,
69 Ga. App. 903, appeal disnmissed, 320 U.S. 712 (1943); State v. Davis, 197 Minn.
381, 267 N.W. 210 (1936). N.Y. PEN. LAw § 722(3), specifically provides that there
shall be punished for disorderly conduct anyone who "congregates with others on a
public street and refuses to move on when ordered by the police." Since "con-
gregates" has been interpreted as requiring at least three persons, see People v.
Carcel, 3 N.Y.2d 327, 144 N.E.2d 81 (1957), the New York cases previously cited
are not affected by this statute.
103 It has been held that refusal to move on is not disturbing the peace. State v.
Small, 184 Iowa 882, 169 N.W. 116 (1918) ; cf. Flores v. City of Denver, 122 Colo. 71,
220 P2d 373 (1950). However, there is language to the contrary, at least where a
large number of people are involved. See Commonwealth v. Sherman, 14 Pa. D. & C. 4,
14 (Quarter Sess. 1930) (dictum).
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refusal to get off a bed to allow officers to search it constitutes resistance; 104
in arriving at its conclusion this court relied upon a case involving actual
assault and battery in which it had been stated that, to prevent occasion
for violence, one who stands in the way of police officers should be found
guilty of obstruction. 1 5  In Bathke v. Myklebust,10 6 a former employee
at a state school for the deaf, having been informed of his dismissal, refused
to return to his superior officer keys given him incident to his employment.
In an action for false imprisonment brought against the superior by the
employee, a verdict for defendant superior was affirmed on the rationale that
the employee's keeping of the keys and thus preventing the superior from
effectively discharging his duties constituted an obstruction and justified
the imprisonment. Such varied actions as refusing to drive a suspectedly
overweight truck onto a scale,10 7 crossing a national guard picket line,108
and declining to answer a question on the witness stand 109 have also been
ruled obstructive. By contrast, one court has held that a refusal to take
manual possession of process as directed by an officer is not "resisting or
opposing." 110 Similarly, refusal to come when called by a policeman was
held not to constitute obstruction; I" nor was refusal to produce colts,
which a sheriff was seeking to attach, resistance. 112  The cases display the
same inconsistency where disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace is the
crime charged.
11 3
(d) Destroying or Tampering With Evidence
Where defendant has destroyed or altered an article or substance
which might have been used as evidence against him, the courts agree
that he has obstructed the officer who was attempting to take possession
104 Speck v. State, 34 Ala. App. 325, 41 So. 2d 198, cert. denied, 252 Ala. 513,
41 So. 2d 200 (1949) ; cf. Cooksey v. State, 84 Ark. 485, 106 S.W. 674 (1907) ; United
States v. Lukens, 26 Fed. Cas. 1011 (No. 15639) (D. Pa. 1818) (dictum).
105Appling v. State, 95 Ark. 185, 128 S.W. 866 (1910).
106 69 S.D. 534, 12 N.W.2d 550 (1943).
107 People v. Fidler, 280 App. Div. 698, 117 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1952) (dictum that
jury could so find).
10 811 re Smith, 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 497, 23 Ohio Dec. 667 (C.P. 1913).
109 Commonwealth v. Hargreaves, 50 Pa. D. & C. 641 (Quarter Sess. 1944)
(refusal to answer a question before a magistrate). The case is perhaps explainable
on the ground that under Albright v. Lapp, 26 Pa. 99 (1856), magistrates have no
power to punish for contempt.
110 Caldwell v. State, 32 Ala. App. 228, 23 So. 2d 876 (1945).
111 City of Monroe v. Ducas, 203 La. 974, 14 So. 2d 781 (1943).
112 State v. Welch, 37 Wis. 196 (1875). The relevant statute included only the
word "resist." It now reads "resists or obstructs." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.41
(1958).
113 See State v. Sanford, 203 La. 961, 14 So. 2d 778 (1943) (passing out
leaflets after being told not to do so by police held not disturbing the peace);
People v. Heinlein, 172 N.Y. Supp. 669 (Westchester County Ct. 1918) (refusal to
ring church bells after being ordered to do so by mayor held not disturbing the
peace).
[Vol.108:388
OBSTRUCTING A PUBLIC OFFICER
of that evidence.1 14 Thus, in Johnson v. State ex rel. Maxey,"15 where
defendant placed a foreign substance in a container of fruit juice which
had been collected for testing and examination, making impossible any
subsequent analysis of the juice, defendant's arrest for obstructing was
sustained against an attack by habeas corpus. Likewise, where defendant
broke loaves of bread which an inspector was about to check for short
weight, the court affirmed a conviction for obstruction. 11
(e) Removing, Refusing To Point Out, or Hiding Property or Persons
Subject to Process
In Crumpton v. Newman, 1 7 plaintiff in an action for false imprison-
ment refused to point out to the attaching officer a wagon load of goods
belonging to another. The court, in holding that there was no legal
justification for his imprisonment, ruled that active opposition was neces-
sary to constitute an offense of obstruction and failed to find such opposi-
tion in plaintiff's refusal. However, where intent to conceal a person
sought by the police can be shown, the act of removing such a person from
the reach of law enforcement officers will make out the offense."18  Some
courts have recognized a distinction between acts affecting the object of
process and acts affecting the serving officer, deeming only the latter
obstruction."19 To these courts, removing or hiding property subject to
judicial levy is obstruction only of the object of process, not of the officer.'
20
Other courts have refused to allow this distinction and have held either
114 See, e.g., Johnson v. State ex rel. Maxey, 99 Fla. 1311, 128 So. 853 (1930) ;
People v. Lanza, 55 P.R.. 208 (1939) ; State v. Sandman, 4 Utah 2d 69, 286 P.2d
1060 (1955). The only Canadian Case discovered is in accord. Rex v. Schultz,
[1945] 1 West. Weekly R. 493 (Sask. Police Ct). It should be noted that those
courts which adopt the view that the essence of the offense is resisting the officer,
not the process or duty he is attempting to carry out, see notes 119-20 infra and accom-
panying text, could not reach this result. See, e.g., Knoff v. State, 18 Okla. Crim.
36, 192 Pac. 596 (1920) ; State v. Welch, 37 Wis. 196 (1875).
115 99 Fla. 1311, 128 So. 853 (1930).
116 People v. Lanza, 55 P.R.R. 208 (1939).
117 12 Ala. 199 (1847). Miss. CoDE ANx. § 2295 (1956), specifically provides
that refusing to point out property subject to process is a crime. For a case illus-
trating the difficulty of proving the offense see Cantwell v. State, 117 Miss. 152, 77 So.
960 (1918).
118 People v. Maas, 133 Cal. App. 135, 23 P.2d 796 (4th Dist. 1933) ; Hargis v.
Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 174, 144 S.W.2d 214 (1940); cf. Brown v. Commonwealth,
263 S.W.2d 238 (Ky. 1953). In the first two cases it was held that there was in-
sufficient proof of intent
119 See, e.g., State v. Welch, 37 Wis. 196 (1875) (statute included only the word
"resist").
120 Warren v. State, 179 Ark. 725, 17 S.W.2d 866 (1929) ; Davis v. State, 76 Ga.
721 (1886); Knoff v. State, 18 Okla. Crim. 36, 192 Pac. 596 (1920) ; Farris v. State,
82 Tenn. 295 (1884). See also State v. Sotherlen, 16 S.C. Law. 414 (1824), which
reaches the same result by calling a rescue of levied goods a private wrong to the
attaching official.
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type of conduct criminal.121 In Campf v. State,122 a court declining to
make the distinction attempts to line up the cases in terms of the statutory
split between jurisdictions which penalize only obstruction of officers serv-
ing process and those which penalize obstruction of officers in the perform-
ance of any of their duties. While it might be argued that nothing inherent
in the difference between the two general types of obstruction statutes-
which appear to delimit the class of official who may not be obstructed,
not to describe in what manner any given official may be deemed to have
suffered obstruction--compels recognition of this distinction, it is indeed
more plausible to read the process-server statutes, which aim more specifi-
cally at the problem of judicial levy, as intended to cope with all activity
obstructive of official function in that area. Finally, it should be noted
that several states have by statute specifically made it a criminal act to
remove goods sought to be levied upon.1
2 3
THE MODEL PENAL CODE
The Model Penal Code treats the range of situations which arise under
the traditional obstruction statutes in two main sections. Three other
sections may be applicable to specific cases now punishable as obstruction.124
Section 208.30, entitled "Obstructing Administration of Law or Other
Governmental Function," provides:
"A person commits a misdemeanor if he purposely obstructs, impairs
or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function
by force, violence, physical interference or obstacle, breach of official
duty, or any other unlawful act, except that this section shall not apply
to flight by a person charged with crime, refusal to submit to arrest,
failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any
other means of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative inter-
ference with governmental functions." 125
This section is described in the comment as a "general supplement" to the
more specific sections treating various interferences with the proper opera-
tion of the government.'2 6 The comments make clear that the physical
interference envisaged need not be violent: tampering with the motor of
an official's car to prevent him from moving about to attend to his duties
1
2 1 See, e.g., Campf v. State, 80 Ohio St. 321, 88 N.E. 887 (1909); State v.
Johnson, 134 W. Va. 357, 59 S.E.2d 485 (1950). See State v. Morrison, 46 Kan. 679,
689, 27 Pac. 133, 137 (1891), where a jury charge that included a statement that
hiding levied-upon property so that it could not be sold would be obstruction within
the meaning of the pertinent statute was held not reversible error.
12280 Ohio St. 321, 88 N.E. 887 (1909).
2
23 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-708 (1947) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 2296 (1956).
124 The main sections are MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 208.30, 208.31 (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1958). The others are MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 208.22 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957),
208.25, 208.26 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
125 MODEL PENAL CODE §208.30 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
126 MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.30, comment 1 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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suffices. 127 But mere disputation of the officer's authority, or other verbal
challenge or comment offered without physical interference, would seem to
be immune from liability, except in those extreme situations where argu-
ment reaches the level of threat of battery or invitation to mob violence.:2 8
The section clearly encompasses cases of blocking access (dosing a door
in front of police or straddling the doorway), cases of actively concealing
or removing persons or property, and those cases of refusal to obey orders
which involve remaining physically in an officer's way. Query whether it
covers in addition such warnings or advisings of third persons as cause
those persons physically to interfere with the officer; also whether it covers
refusing to open a previously closed door. The latter instance, especially,
appears excluded by the avoiding-compliance exception.
Section 208.31, "Resisting Arrest or Other Law Enforcement,"
provides:
"A person commits a misdemeanor if, for the purpose of preventing a
public servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any other
duty, the person creates a substantial risk of bodily harm to the
officer or others, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial
force to overcome the resistance." 129
Thus, by defining the crime not in terms of any behavioral construct-
whether "obstruction" or some more precise enumeration of specific acts-
which is required to create the requisite risk, but in terms of the creation
of risk itself, the section shifts the focus of inquiry from the nature of the
act to its effect. Conduct of any sort, whether or not currently punishable
under the general obstruction statutes, whether verbal or physical, affirma-
tive or negative, comes within the reach of the Code as soon as it can be
shown to have created a substantial risk of bodily harm. Cases of warning
and advising, then, are culpable subject to the critical qualification of risk-
creation; similarly, instances of flight, specifically exempted from section
208.30, are reached by section 208.31, subject to the same qualification.
Instances of minor scuffling may be amenable to penalty even though they
create no substantial risk of bodily harm: alternatively, they are criminal
if "justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome." Whether those
instances of warning or advising which cause a third person to oppose
police, and whether wholly negative acts such as refusal to open an
already locked door, may not also be criminal under the second clause of
208.31, without requirement of meeting the risk-creation qualification, may
127 MODEL. PENAL CODE § 208.30, comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
128 Such invitation to mob action in a potential riot situation is presently a crime.
See, e.g., In the Matter of Stanridge, 23 Cal. App. 2d 95, 72 P2d 162 (3d Dist.
1937); People v. King, 236 Mich. 405, 210 N.W. 235 (1926); Commonwealth v.
Frankenfeld, 114 Pa. Super. 262, 173 At. 834 (1934) ; cf. Armstrong v. Vicksburg,
S. & P.R.P., 46 La. Ann. 1448, 16 So. 468 (1894). See also Pierce v. State, 17 Tex.
Crim. 232 (1884) (defendant stood by with gun in holster while brother argued with
officer). See also MoDEL. PENAL CODE § 208.31 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
129 MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.31 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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depend upon whether such verbal action or entire non-action constitutes an
"employment of means" within the section.
A reading of section 208.22 indicates that lying to or misinforming a
public officer, so long as the false communication is oral, is not an offense
under the Code. That section, which defines the crime of unsworn falsifi-
cation to authorities, is limited to "any written false statement" 130 and, as
the comment explains, impliedly excludes oral misstatements.131 Another
particular variety of obstructive behavior is singled out for specific treat-
ment, within specific limitation, in section 208.25, which makes responsible
one who,
"believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or
contemplated . . . attempts to induce or otherwise cause a witness
or informant to:
(c) elude legal process summoning the person to testify; or
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he
has been legally summoned." 132
And, similarly, section 208.26 separately establishes the offense of tamper-
ing with physical evidence,133 subject to the limitation that the tampering
party believe that "an official proceeding or investigation is pending or
about to be instituted." 134 Such belief in the pendency or imminence of
proceedings remains an element in the criminality of the destruction of
evidence only until such time as a public officer attempts to reduce the
evidence to possession, however; once the officer appears on the scene,
destruction would be punishable under 208.30. The overlapping of the
sections in this dimension, section 208.30 relaxing the more stringent
scienter requirement of section 208.26 insofar as the former is applicable,
is consonant with the different purposes of the two provisions: 208.26 aims
primarily at the protection of the judicial function; 208.30 attempts, inter
alia, to reduce occasions of possible violence by deterring interference with
the officer in the field.
Punishment of Verbal Conduct Under the Code
As regards conduct involving only verbal challenge of an officer's
authority or criticism of his actions, misinformation given the officer, or
warning or advice given to third persons, the Code's position that a pur-
130 MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.22(1) (a) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
131 MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.22, comment (Tent Draft No. 6, 1957). Note that
§ 208.24 does establish an offense for a particular variety of oral misstatement: acts
in the nature of reporting nonexistent crimes which would constitute "Wasting En-
forcement Facilities." MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.24(2) (Tent Draft No. 6, 1957).
132 MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.25(1) (c), (d) (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
133 MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.26 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). Comparable state
statutes include N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 2440, 2441; O.LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 546 (1951).
134 MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.26 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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posive, substantial risk of bodily harm must be created before the offense
can be made out, seems best to balance the several competing interests.
All such activity operates, of course, to impair the working efficiency
of government agents-whether it misdirects or merely demoralizes the
policeman, makes him the target of a bullet or only of public ridicule. Yet
the countervailing danger that would lie in the stifling of all individual
power to resist-the danger of an omnipotent, unquestionable officialdom
-- demands some sacrifice of efficiency to the embarrassing, the miscon-
ceived, even the vicious forces of private opposition. If the police official
needs a certain sphere of flexibility and permissible error, so too does the
citizen: the latter must be able to complain, to criticize and to question
without running the risk that if subsequent judicial deliberation adjudges
his communications technically erroneous in point of law, he may be
punished for having made them. It may be convincingly argued that to
allow the challenge of police actions is conducive to the improvement of the
quality of those actions;'1 5 but the strongest case for allowing challenge
is simply the imponderable risk of abuse-to what extent realized it would
never be possible to ascertain-that lies in the state in which no challenge
is allowed.136 Similarly, to penalize per se the misinforming of an officer,
to invest the policeman with the power of a court to compel truth and thus
to expand the realm of punishable perjury from the cautioning solemnity of
statement under oath into the casual conversation of street corners, taverns
or homes, is a proceeding whose dangers far outweigh its conceivable utility.
Probably unenforceable in practice, its greatest effect might well be to
arouse public hostility and uncooperativeness toward the police.
The prospect of application of the obstruction concept to punish one
who advises another to do an act obstructive of official functioning high-
lights perhaps most clearly that throughout the whole range of verbal
conduct considered, constitutional free speech safeguards apply.137 In
specific instances the first or fourteenth amendments themselves may pro-
hibit the imposition of penal sanctions: consider the case of the advisor
who counsels persons under arrest to remain silent until they can procure
legal representation.1 38 But even where oral communications fall without
the pale of the amendments' protection-whether because creating a "clear
' 3 5 See CHAFFE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) ; cf. Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 328 (1951) (dis-
senting opinion).
136 Of course, the necessity for preserving the right of the individual to criticize
does not justify leaving him totally irresponsible to harass police with obscene and
abusive language. While not within the scope of § 208.31, extreme profanity or
boisterousness might legitimately be brought within some other offense, perhaps
disorderly conduct, which might be so defined as to provide an appropriate standard
of criminality specifically regarding such conduct.
13 7 See People v. Pilkington, 199 Misc. 665, 103 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Broome County
Ct. 1951), where the court refused to apply an ordinance whose operative words
were "harm, obstruct or resist" because to do so would endanger the right of free
speech. See also People v. Weissman, 138 Misc. 542, 247 N.Y. Supp. 372 (Ct Spec.
Sess. 1930).
138 But cf. Rex v. L., 51 Ont L.R. 575, 69 D.L.R. 618 (1922).
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and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
[the legislature] has a right to prevent," 139 or because they are of the
class of "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or 'fighting words'-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" 14 0-the intendment of the
amendments may suggest, as a principle of value, that penal legislation
should not push to the very limits of constitutional protection.141 The
amendments, of course, prescribe mere minima of liberty: it is not every
substantive evil within the power of the legislature to prevent whose
possible occurrence should justify restraint upon expression. These con-
siderations are admittedly strongest as regards those kinds of conduct
which have been classified as arguing with or criticizing officials or advising
third persons, where possible impediment of the dissemination of truth 1 42
is most threatened by overhanging criminal sanction. There is perhaps less
social value in permitting warnings--communications which, by alerting
violators or prospective violators of the law that police are on the scene,
permit escape or the destruction of evidence. Such activity may be difficult
to punish under accomplice principles-precisely because it often makes
impossible proof of the substantive crime. But to punish warnings as
obstruction presents a number of serious problems. Is distinction to be
made between a warning which prevents commission of a crime and a
warning which prevents apprehension? To punish all instances of the
former would be self-defeating in a criminal jurisprudence that aims at
deterrence. But on what grounds is the distinction to be made? Is it to
turn upon fortuities of timing? Or, as has been suggested, 143 upon inten-
tion or motive? The latter seems administratively unworkable. Further-
more there is the danger that, if prosecution under an obstruction provision
be allowed, a prosecutor who has some doubt as to his ability to make out a
case for liability of some more serious crime under accomplice doctrine
may use the obstruction statute and settle for a lesser penalty, whereas the
interests of effective and even-handed criminal administration would seem
better served by the accomplice prosecution. 144 Much of warning behavior
139 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See also Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). These cases, the progenitors of the clear and present
danger doctrine, arose under an obstruction statute, Espionage Act of 1917, tit. 1,
§ 3, 40 Stat. 219.
140 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
141In some circumstances the amendments themselves may prohibit the legis-
lature from crowding the individual to their very limits by vague and general penal
laws which force him to guess the location of those limits at his peril. Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). In
light of the inconsistent invocation of the obstruction principle, both as among the
jurisdictions and within particular jurisdictions, it seems hardly necessary to insist
upon the vagueness of obstruction legislation.
142 See generally CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 135, at 149; Mill, On Liberty in
GREAT LEGAL. PHiosoi'nzRs 381 (Morris ed. 1959).
143 Bastable v. Little, [1907] 1 K-B. 59, 63 (1906).
2
4 4 For the potential dangers of allowing wide prosecutorial discretion see gen-
erally Note, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1057 (1955); Note, 65 YALE L.J. 209 (1955).
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may in any event be undeterrable, as motivated by forces of loyalty which
are too strong to be suppressed by any punishment short of the most
severe; and very severe penalties for warnings, even if deemed appropriate
by the legislature, are very liable to jury nullification.
But to consider the applicability of the Code to specific isolated cate-
gories of behavior and to assess the merits of its position in terms of the
social value or social detriment of each category as a category is, to a great
extent, precisely to belie the genius of the Code. For the Code attaches
liability to no particular act or acts: it penalizes any and all acts which are
performed with the requisite intent and whose commission has the requisite
risk-creating consequences. In its failure to specify isolable instances of
conduct, it is like the general obstruction statutes; but, unlike them, it
supplies in terms of the effect of conduct a single, objective standard. That
standard-substantial risk of bodily harm to the officer or to anyone else---
seems not only constitutionally unassailable,1 45 but normatively reasonable.
It may not draw as sharp a line of discrimination as would be the ideal of
a penal provision, but the line it draws seems as sharp as the area permits.
As regards the purposive creation of substantial risk of bodily harm,
Justice Holmes' observation is apposite: although "the precise course of
the line may be uncertain, . . . no one can come near it without knowing
that he does so, if he thinks, and if he does so it is familiar to the criminal
law to make him take the risk." 146
This discussion assumes that verbal acts which fail to create a sub-
stantial risk of bodily harm are not made punishable under the Code by
operation of the second disjunctive phrase of section 208.31. While it
might conceivably be argued that one who by the use of words causes
another to act in such a manner as to require or justify a public officer's
use of substantial force, although no substantial risk of bodily harm to the
officer or any other is created, falls within the meaning of the section, this
reading seems implausible. Such situations will in any event be rare,
inasmuch as it will probably seldom occur that the activity of the third
person, if it justifies the use of substantial force by the officer, will not ipso
facto create a substantial risk of bodily harm to the third person himself,
as object of the officer's use of force. But where such a circumstance does
arise-as in the case, perhaps, of one who advises or warns a third party to
lock a door against entering officers, so that the door has to be broken in-
it is suggested that the intendment of the section excludes it. Section
208.31 is by its title directed specifically at resisting arrest or other law
enforcement. Within this context it punishes the employment of means
which justify the use of force to overcome. The means themselves must
be susceptible to, and must demand, being overcome by force. It would
seem difficult under the section to make out a case against merely verbal
acts.
145 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). See DUNxER, SOME OBSmVATONS
ON THE FouR FREEnous OF THE FIRST AMOENDMENT 6-19 (1957).
146 United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930).
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Punishment of Physical Acts Under the Code
Through the dovetailing of sections 208.30 and 208.31, then, the Code
makes-as the current general obstruction statutes fail to make-a sharp
distinction between verbal and physical acts. While both, when creative
of the requisite risk of harm, come under 208.31, the latter, and the latter
only, 47 are susceptible of punishment under 208.30. Under that section,
the operative words "obstructs, impairs or perverts" are reminiscent of
common general obstruction language. Yet, even as it applies to the
strictly delimited field of non-verbal activity, the Code's approach diverges
in several particulars abruptly from that of the currently governing statutes.
In the first regard, the object of the obstruction punished by section
208.30 is not the officer himself, but the "administration of law or other
governmental function." This concept would appear to foreclose ab initio
judicial development of the obscure and impractical distinction presently
made in some jurisdictions 148 between obstruction of the object of process
and obstruction of the serving officer. More significantly, by eschewing
definition in terms of the duties or authority of the particular official in-
volved,149 it may also foreclose, in prosecutions under 208.30, the enforce-
ment court's inquiry into the precise technical legality of authorization of
that official. Thus, while it offers what seems an adequate safeguard
against purely arbitrary action by public officers-inasmuch as one who
opposes acts of an officer which are wholly without color of law or in sub-
stantial violation of the opponent's or others' constitutional or statutory
rights would not appear to obstruct the administration of law or other
governmental function-the section does not embody the ritualistic doctrine
which, although punishing the slightest physical scuffling against an au-
thorized officer, justifies even serious assault and battery against an officer
serving formally defective process.'8 0 In this connection, however, the
Code explicitly exempts from the stricter standards of section 208.30, inter
alia, "refusal to submit to arrest," which conduct is thus relegated for
punishment, if at all, to section 208.31. The vagueness of the operative
language here, which leaves unclear whether only the abstract construct of
refusing qua refusing is excepted from 208.30 or whether all physical re-
sistance, up to and including substantial battery, is also immunized if
carried on as accessory to refusal, is unfortunate, for while section 208.31
of course catches up all activity threatening bodily injury, that section seems
by its terms to remain subject to the technical clogs from which 208.30 is
liberated. True, the "lawful arrest" and "other duty" language of 208.31
147 Note, however, that if the manner of a verbal utterance is such as to render
it illegal independently of the obstruction section-as, for example, disorderly con-
duct, see note 136 sipra-the utterance may be read back into § 208.30 through the
"other unlawful act" clause.
148 See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text.
149 Compare OKLA. STAT. AN. tit. 21, § 540 (1951) ("obstructs any public
officer in the discharge [of] any duty of his office").
' 5 0 See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
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is in the "purpose" clause, rather than the effect clause, of that section, and
therefore fails to clarify whether there is penalized behavior whose purpose
is to prevent an arrest in fact lawful or, more broadly, any arrest which the
person resisting has no reason to believe is not lawful. But there remains
the possibility, on the language of the Code, that battery of an officer may
escape 208.30 as incident to a refusal to submit to arrest 151 and, though
creating substantial risk of bodily harm, escape section 208.31 through
technical defectiveness of an arrest warrant. The problem of balancing the
countervailing pressures in this area is a difficult one. The compelling
interest in leaving unpunished private resistance to the illegal exercise of
authority is counterweighted by the inadvisability of allowing justification
on the grounds of insignificant matters of form. Moreover, varieties of
resistance are not of a piece. While a given technical defect of process may
be deemed too insignificant to justify physical attack on the serving officer,
it may well justify flight or other evasion. The scheme of the Code, al-
though more successful than that of current law under obstruction and
resistance statutes, seems nevertheless insufficiently articulate to cope with
this problem.
On the other hand, the Code's treatment of the problems of flight and
of non-affirmative avoidance of compliance with law seems both reasonably
conceived and effectively accomplished. The comment to 208.30 explains
that the rationale for excepting instances of flight from that section is that
police have the right to pursue and to use adequate force to effect arrest
and that, once arrested, the fugitive may be prosecuted for the original
offense; if he cannot be convicted of that, it is said, "it would be unjust
and conducive to grave abuse to permit prosecution for an unsuccessful
effort to evade the police." 152 In fact, flight from enforcement officers
may well be an undeterrable activity: persons who have reason to believe
that they will be convicted of a substantive offense are unlikely to be
dissuaded from fleeing by the imposition of an additional thirty days to
whatever sentence they already fear, and those who have only cause to
deem themselves entirely innocent are likely to feel so terrified, indignant
or righteous that their impulse to get out of the grip of officers will be
little susceptible of control. And to allow a vehicle by which a prosecutor
may, on the one hand, take the easy road to minor conviction of one whom,
with more assiduity he might prove guilty of a substantive offense and,
on the other, harass one whom he cannot prove guilty of that offense, seems
ill-suited to effective criminal administration. The state's case against one
who does no more than flee should stand or fall with its ability to convict
him of the principal crime in connection with which his detention was
sought. The most, in addition, that it is reasonable to demand of him is
151 MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.30, comment 5 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958), indi-
cates that the intent of the exception extends to one "who runs away from an
arresting officer or who makes an effort to shake off the policeman's detaining arm."
Query whether the language of the section itself is necessarily so limited.
152 MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.30, comment 5 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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that the means of his flight be such as not to constitute a danger to others;
this demand is vindicated by his liability under the risk-creation provision of
section 208.31.
Likewise, the exemption from section 208.30 of "failure to perform
a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other means of avoiding
compliance with law without affirmative interference with governmental
functions," seems well reasoned. The clear intendment of the exception
is to assure that neither through employment of the obstruction provision
alone, nor through issuance by any public officer of orders whose enforce-
ment may subsequently be sought under the obstruction provision, can
there be laid upon the individual a positive obligation to assist in the
procedures of administration of the law, or to cooperate in or facilitate
those procedures. A few jurisdictions have by statute imposed such an
obligation, at least to the extent of making the citizen responsible to help
effect an arrest when called upon to do so.-53 But these endeavors to
compel cooperation through penal coercion will probably be of little effect as
regards persons who, whether timorous of or sympathetic toward the
arrestee, would be disinclined to offer aid on their own initiative; and
there exists the danger that police will be encouraged to pass the executive
buck. Apart from such attempts to involve the individual as a participant
in the administrative enforcement machinery, orders issued by public
officers will operate in two distinct settings: where the order commands the
doing or not doing of an act which is prescribed or prohibited by law
independent of the officer's order; or where the order commands behavior
not otherwise legally required, but which would aid or implement the
officer's accomplishment of his duties. In the former situation, where an
order directs an affirmative act which constitutes the termination of a state
of being already in violation of some provision of law, non-compliance is of
course punishable as violation of that provision, and the cumulation of
another penalty for obstruction adds nothing but the possibility of
prosecutorial abuse. Orders of the second variety-those which seek to
compel behavior upon the authority of the officer alone-have frequently
been enforced by convictions for non-compliance with them under the
general obstruction statutes.154 Yet there are significant reasons to strictly
limit the power of the police and other officials in this regard. Where
non-compliance with an officer's order occurs in a situation where the non-
complier is himself the object of the officer's attempts at law enforcement,
considerations analogous to those underlying the constitutional self-incrim-
ination safeguards often come into play. While the law presently limits
these safeguards to the specific situation of oral testimony,155 some of the
evil aimed at by the fifth amendment-the indignity of forcing an individual
to be the agent of his own subjection to the enforcement procedures of
153 See, e.g., MAss. STAT. ANN. tit. 268, § 24 (1956) ; N.C. STAT. ANN. § 14-224
(1953). None of these statutes seems ever to have been judicially interpreted.
15 4 See notes 100-13 supra and accompanying text.
'55 See, e.g., United States v. Nesmith, 121 F. Supp. 758 (D.D.C. 1954).
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the law ' 5°-may be present in instances of refusal to comply with police
orders. 157 But even in circumstances in which these considerations are
not present-as where an individual insists on standing by while the police
are questioning others,158 or refuses to move along as ordered 1'9-there is
frequently a social value in permitting private persons to stand their
ground. As it is desirable to preserve an opportunity of verbal criticism
as a curb against potential police abuses, so it is desirable that members of
the public be allowed to post themselves where they will and to observe
police action. To place in the hands of every officer a power to create
affirmative duties, to tailor them to the felt needs-and, indeed, to the
immediate passions-of the situation, and to impose them upon selected
individuals is a practice full of possibilities of prejudiced and arbitrary
action. Yet, on the other hand, because the metaphysical line between
activity and non-activity is often neither clear nor determinative of practical
consequences, because the mere presence of persons on a scene may often
pose a substantial threat to the public safety, the individual cannot be left
completely free to decline to act upon police command. In such a case-
as where groups of persons block the street and prevent passage by
others '6 0 or by the officers, 61 or threaten to erupt into violence or to
precipitate riot 162-- the Code's substantial-risk-of-bodily-harm provision,
section 208.31, seems well adapted to afford the necessary instrument of
control.
R.J. K.
156 See, e.g., Horowitz, The Privilege Against Self-Incriinination-How Did it
Originate?, 31 Tmm. L.Q. 121 (1958).
157 See, e.g., Speck v. State, 34 Ala. App. 325, 41 So. 2d 198, cert. denied, 252 Ala.
513, 41 So. 2d 200 (1949).
158 See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 38 N.J. Super. 6, 30, 118 A.2d 36, 48 (App. Div.
1955), in which such standing by was held to be "interference."
159 Rex v. Golden, 51 B.C. 236, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 350 (Ct. App. 1936) ; The King v.
Leclaire, 12 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann., 332 (Que. K.B. 1906). In both cases defendant
refused to move when ordered to do so and was found guilty of "obstruction."
160 Despard v. Wilcox, 102 L.T.R. (ns.) 103 (KB. 1910) ; Pankhurst v. Jarvis,
101 L.T.R. (n.s.) 946 (KB. 1909). In both cases a large group of suffragettes com-
pletely blocked the street; held criminal.
161 See Commonwealth v. Baltzley, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 235 (Quarter Sess. 1956),
where, according to the indictment, defendants formed a human chain across the
road preventing the sheriff from proceeding on to break up a riot. On demurrer
this indictment was upheld, but upon trial it appeared that the sheriff was leading
a caravan of cars containing strikebreakers and the court directed a verdict for
defendants, apparently on the ground that the sheriff was not performing his duty.
162 
It should be pointed out that this rationale may justify the result, if not the
language, of State v. Taylor, 38 N.J. Super. 6, 118 A.2d 36 (App. Div. 1955), since
the court points out that all the bystanders including defendant were Negroes, the
police were white, and the occurrences took place during a time of racial uneasiness.
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